

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 EUR-12 H-01 INR-10 IO-13
L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05 SP-02
SS-15 ICA-11 TRSE-00 NSC-05 /094 W
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R 130831Z JUN 78
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2933
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO USMISSION USNATO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0333

E O 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR
SUBJ: MBFR: DELEGATION EVALUATION OF EAST'S JUNE 8 PROPOSALS

REF: MBFR VIENNA 330

1. AS REQUESTED, THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS THE DELEGATION'S INITIAL EVALUATION OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS OF JUNE 8 AS A CONTRIBUTION TO EVALUATION OF THEIR MILITARY AND POLITICAL ASPECTS BY WASHINGTON AGENCIES. THE ANALYSIS ON WHICH THIS MESSAGE IS BASED IS CONTAINED IN THE DRAFT REPORT TO THE COUNCIL ALREADY SUBMITTED TO WASHINGTON.
2. OUR PRELIMINARY OVERALL EVALUATION OF THE JUNE 8 EASTERN PROPOSALS IS THAT, PRIMARILY BECAUSE THE EAST HAS NOT IN CONNECTION WITH ITS NEW PROPOSAL MADE THE MOVES ON DATA WHICH WOULD SIGNAL AN EASTERN DECISION TO PRESS FOR AN AGREEMENT, THESE PROPOSALS ARE NOT SUFFICIENT TO MOVE THE VIENNA NEGOTIA-
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TIONS INTO A DECISIVE PHASE.

3. NOR DO THE PROPOSALS AS YET PROVIDE A SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR THE CONVENING OF A FOREIGN MINISTERS SESSION. IN ADDITION TO THE UNRESOLVED STATE OF THE DATA ISSUE, THIS IS BECAUSE THESE EASTERN PROPOSALS RESOLVE IN A DIFINITIVE WAY ONLY THE ISSUE OF WESTERN AIR FORCE MANPOWER REDUCTIONS AND, IN A PARTIAL

WAY AS AFFECTS PHASE I, THE ISSUE OF WHAT ARMAMENTS WILL BE REDUCED IN AN AGREEMENT. AS ANALYZED IN SECTION B OF REFTEL, IN ITS PROPOSALS, THE EAST HAS MADE SOME MOVEMENT ON SEVERAL FURTHER ISSUES. BUT NONE OF THESE AS YET HAS DEVELOPED FAR ENOUGH TO PERMIT ITS RESOLUTION IN THE NEAR TERM.

4. AT THE SAME TIME, THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSALS DO CONTAIN ENOUGH SUBSTANCE TO PROVIDE FOR A MORE ACTIVE PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA. THUS, THEY EVIDENCE AN EASTERN DESIRE THAT THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD APPEAR TO BE A SERIOUS NEGOTIATION. INTER ALIA, BY ACCEPTING THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN OUTCOME OF NUMERICAL EQUALITY ON EACH SIDE FOR GROUND FORCES MANPOWER THROUGH REDUCTIONS WHICH WOULD BE COMPUTED AS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE AGREED TOTAL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER STRENGTH OF EACH SIDE AND A GROUND FORCE COMMON CEILING AT 700,000 MEN, THE EAST HAS IN PRACTICE ACCEPTED THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE WESTERN APPROACH TO MANPOWER REDUCTIONS. MOREOVER, THE EAST HAS NARROWED NEGOTIATION DIFFERENCES ON SEVERAL ISSUES. THIS MEANS THAT IF A BREAKTHROUGH ON DATA SHOULD BE ACHIEVED, THE CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE FOR AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE AVAILABLE EVEN THOUGH MANY IMPORTANT INDIVIDUAL PROBLEMS WOULD STILL HAVE TO BE RESOLVED.

5. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT NEGOTIATING CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE PRESENTATION TO THE EAST OF A FORMAL OVERALL WESTERN EVALUATION OR CHARACTERIZATION OF THE EAST'S JUNE 8 PROPOSALS. WE BELIEVE THE WEST SHOULD FOLLOW AN EXPLORING AND PROBING TACTIC,
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BREAKING THE EAST'S PROPOSALS INTO ITS SEPARATE COMPONENTS AND DEALING WITH EACH INDIVIDUALLY, EXPOSING THE INCONSISTENCIES OF THE EASTERN POSITION ON SOME ISSUES, SUCH AS THE EASTERN PROPOSAL THAT THE USSR COULD REVOKE ITS OBLIGATIONS, AND PROBING FOR POSSIBLE FURTHER EASTERN FLEXIBILITY ON OTHER ITEMS, SUCH AS THE EAST'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF COLLECTIVITY OR ITS OFFER TO REDUCE TWO SOVIET DIVISIONS AND 1,000 TANKS. WESTERN NEGOTIATORS COULD THUS INDICATE TO THE EAST THAT THE WEST CONSIDERS THAT SEVERAL OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS ARE USEFUL AND WISHES TO EXPLORE THEIR SIGNIFICANCE FURTHER.

6. AT THE SAME TIME, THE DATA DISCUSSION SHOULD BE

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7. IT CAN BE PREDICTED THAT THE EAST WILL PUSH STRONGLY FOR SOME RESPONSE, I.E., SOME RETURN MOVE BY THE WEST. THE WEST SHOULD CONSIDER WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE AT A LATER POINT TO MAKE SOME MOVES IN RETURN FOR THE JUNE 8 PROPOSALS IN ORDER TO GENERATE SOME MOMENTUM IN THE TALKS AND PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR FURTHER EASTERN MOVES TOWARDS THE WESTERN POSITION.

8. AMONG THE POSSIBILITIES TO BE CONSIDERED, TWO APPEAR PLAUSIBLE AT THIS TIME:

(1) THE WEST COULD MAKE A STATEMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DATA DISCUSSION THAT IT IS WILLING TO ADOPT THE EAST'S POSITION ON THE ALLOCATION OF THE THREE DISPUTED CATEGORIES OF MILITARY MANPOWER BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR FORCES, COUNTING LIKE FORCES ALIKE. SPECIFICALLY, THE WEST COULD AGREE TO ALLOCATE POLISH AND CZECHOSLOVAK GROUND BASED AIR DEFENSE

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MANPOWER TO AIR FORCES AND EASTERN GROUND SUPPORT HELICOPTER MANPOWER, PLUS THE MANPOWER OF THE FRG PERSHING MISSILE BRIGADE, TO GROUND FORCES. THIS STEP WOULD RECTIFY A LONG-STANDING INCONSISTENCY IN THE WESTERN DATA ABOUT WHICH THE EAST HAS FREQUENTLY COMPLAINED. IT WOULD STRENGTHEN THE AUTHORITY OF THE WEST'S POSITION ON DATA AT A TIME WHEN THE WEST WILL BE PRESSING ITS DOUBTS OF THE AUTHENTICITY OF EASTERN FIGURES. MOREOVER, SUCH A STEP COULD PROVIDE A PLAUSIBLE

ENTREE INTO A REOPENING OF THE DEFINITIONS ISSUE, WHICH MAY PROVE A HOPEFUL AVENUE TOWARDS AN ULTIMATE RESOLUTION OF THE DATA ISSUE.

(2) WESTERN EUROPEAN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND CANADA COULD MAKE A STATEMENT THAT THEY EACH WOULD TAKE A SUBSTANTIAL SHARE OF TOTAL PHASE II WESTERN MANPOWER REDUCTIONS AND THAT, PRIOR TO SIGNATURE OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT, THE EAST WOULD BE INFORMED OF THE SPECIFIC AMOUNTS OF MEN TO BE REDUCED IN PHASE II BY EACH OF THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THIS WOULD BE CONDITIONAL ON EXPLICIT EAST/WEST AGREEMENT THAT THIS INFORMATION COULD NOT IN ANY SENSE BE USED TO ESTABLISH MANPOWER LIMITATIONS OF ANY KIND FOR THE FORCES OF THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS CONCERNED, AND THAT THE EAST WOULD AGREE TO ACCEPT THE WESTERN POSITION ON MANPOWER LIMITATIONS, I.E., A COLLECTIVE CEILING FOR THE OVERALL MANPOWER OF EACH SIDE, WITH SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS ON US AND SOVIET MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE AREA.

(3) SUCH A POSITION WOULD PARTIALLY RECTIFY AN UNTENABLE ASPECT OF THE WESTERN POSITION, THAT IS, THAT THE NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD NOT PROVIDE ANY INDICATION OF THE DIMENSION OF THEIR INDIVIDUAL PHASE II REDUCTIONS PRIOR TO SIGNATURE OF THE PHASE I AGREEMENT. NOW THAT THE EAST HAS TAKEN THE FIRST MOVE TOWARD THE WESTERN POSITION ON COLLECTIVITY, SUCH A WESTERN MOVE COULD PROVIDE A RESPONSE AND COULD
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ADVANCE THE DIFFICULT ISSUE OF MANPOWER LIMITATIONS CLOSER TO SOLUTION. SUCH A MOVE COULD ALSO HAVE SOME POSITIVE IMPACT ON THE EASTERN POSITION ON DATA. AT THE SAME TIME IT WOULD NOT JEOPARDIZE THE WESTERN POSITION ON NATIONAL CEILINGS. RESOR

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